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CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND ITS CRITICS

III. SOME QUESTIONS FOR REPUBLICANS
DON HERZOG
University of Michigan

VEN A SLEEPY historiographer of political theory of some
future day will notice the most dramatic revision of the last 25 years or
so. I refer of course to the discovery-and celebration-of civic
humanism. The devilish Machiavelli of Elizabethan times has been
gently set aside for "the divine Machiavel, " 1 the one who writes, "I love
my native city more than my soul. " 2 And historians of political thought
have lovingly traced the transmission of civic humanism from Florence
to England and America, giving us a brand new past. America, we now
know, was not the unthinkingly Lockean land served up by Louis
Hartz. 3 Instead, our Founding Fathers-the phrase becomes more
appropriate now-tum out to have been steeped in republicanism.
I do not doubt that this revisionist scholarship has been, on the
whole, a good thing. But two features of it are troubling. First, there
seem to be some generally unstated convictions about the links between
the history of political thought and current political debate, links worth
flushing out and assessing critically. Second, regardless of whether the
links are valid, civic humanism is now regularly held up as an attractive
alternative to liberalism; but humanists have advanced a remarkably
hazy doctrine. To make their critique more penetrating, they need to
answer some pressing questions, questions I will pose in a deliberately
innocent way.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: My thanks to David Anderson, Mark Brandon, Shelley Burtt,
Martha Feldman, Amy Gutmann, Isaac Kramnick, Arlene Saxonhouse, Kim Scheppe/e,
Joel Schwartz, Bernie Yack, and the editor of this journal for comments on an earlier
draft.
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I
Like other revisionist scholarship, the literature on civic humanism
has been marked by an extraordinary and excessive zeal. Sometimes one
suspects that the goal is to show that there never were any liberals, or
that John Locke was the only one in world history. Donald Winch has
managed to read even Adam Smith as a republican, by focusing on
Smith's account of the militia. 4 One can always quibble with such
overstatements. So, for example, I would argue that Winch has missed a
rather mischievous riposte from Smith to his dear friend David Hume,
who managed occasionally to say nice things about militias. 5 Smith
thinks it is easy to show that militias are obsolete, that the changed
military and political circumstances of modern society make it absurd to
rely on them for national defense. He thus uses a Humean argument
against Hume, beginning by launching into praise of militias and their
place in restoring civic virtue, but closing by noting drily that, as it turns
out, militias always lose to standing armies. 6
It is of concern to Smith scholarship whether or not Winch gets Smith
right on military matters. But it hardly matters in assessing the drift of
humanist revisionism. We should expect and even desire a fair amount
of overstatement, of judgments that can't possibly be sustained upon
mature deliberation. Revisionists generally want to topple some received
wisdom, and received wisdom tends to be unhappily ossified stuff. It
may take excessive zeal to motivate an attack on it, and it may take
excessive zeal to succeed in correcting its worst errors. 7 The intellectual
community should eventually straighten things out, and may find itself
indebted to its most onesided members. (Objectivity thus depends not
on saintly individuals with an austere regard for truth, but on free
exchange among many individuals, all of whom may be biased.) So
much is all too familiar from Mill; I merely suggest recalling his
argument in the heat and fury of duels over footnotes.
But some of the zeal animating republican revisionism is not purely
historiographical. It often seems that the goal is to show that civic
humanism is a valuable possibility today. That goal is sometimes made
explicit, sometimes hinted at. Quentin Skinner, in an illuminating
reading of Machiavelli on freedom, says boldly, "I shall attempt to show
... that the Roman stoic way of thinking about political liberty is indeed
the tradition we need above all to recapture if we wish to provide a
corrective to the dogmatism about the topic of social freedom that
marks both Hobbes' Leviathan and the writings of more recent theorists
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of natural or human rights. " 8 J.G.A. Pocock, more elusively, comments
that "there are (if it matters) ideological reasons" for pursuing the
history of civic humanism "in its own terms. "9 And Michael Sandel
declares that "If the 'republican school' is right about our ideological
origins, then perhaps there is hope for revitalizing our public life and
restoring a sense of community .... So the debate about the meaning of
our past carries consequences for the debate about present political
possibilities. " 10
Why should the historical presence or absence of some tradition have
anything to do with today's political debates? I do not mean to suggest a
global skepticism about studying the history of political theory. My
point is more restricted: Suppose someone today wants to champion the
cause of civic humanism. Why should he or she care whether or not
people 200 (or 300, or 400) years ago championed it too? Isn't it
appropriate to let the dead rest in peace? Doesn't it smack of ancestorworship to think the cause is somehow legitimated by the discovery that
it was prized long ago?
There are different ways to answer this question, some of them more
sensible than others. Let me review the answers suggested by the three
authors I mentioned above.
Skinner's goal is to articulate a conception of freedom that will meet a
challenge posed squarely by Isaiah Berlin. He wants a notion that will
surpass negative freedom, but without embracing any controversial
Aristotelian assumptions about man's true end or highest nature. He
needs, then, to tie freedom to activities like participation without
claiming that human beings flourish most fully in participating. Skinner
is surely capable of putting arguments in his own voice; he doesn't need
to hide behind the capacious skirts of Machiavelli. As he notes,
however, "it is apt to seem much less convincing to suggest that a
concept might be coherently used in an unfamiliar way than to show that
it has been put to unfamiliar but coherent uses. " 11 It is one thing to
sketch a defense of participation that links it only to ensuring the
continued ability to pursue one's ends, whatever they are, another to
explicate an existing and richly complex defense. Philosophers these
days are likely to think of the discussion of Machiavelli as an intrusion,
but Skinner's strategy seems quite sensible.
Pocock's goals are less obvious. J. H. Hexter has marveled at
Pocock's ability to frame an encyclopedic account of modern political
thought and resolutely avoid mentioning liberalism. 12 One might
wonder just what the point is of being quite so insistently devoted to
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resurrecting republicanism, or suspect that Pocock's tale is something
like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead-or perhaps Grendel. But
Pocock has suggested a quite sensible goal in discussing The Machiavellian Moment, in referring to "critics ofliberalism who maximize its role
in order to provide themselves with an antithesis." 13 Marxists and
Straussians, he points out, are both committed to offering us a picture of
modernity riveted on liberalism. If the present is fatally flawed by
liberalism, one can then consider proffered alternatives to liberalism,
whether some brave future socialism or some wistfully recalled Athens.
Both modes of argument are, despite Strauss's pointed objections,
historicist; both inescapably tie questions of historical development to
evaluating our present possibilities. 14 If modernity is in fact not
benightedly liberal through and through, Marxist and Straussian
polemics alike lose much of their force. For we don't face the awful
predicament they summon up as their starting point.
Sandel's suggestion is the most ambitious of the three, and bears
repetition: "If the 'republican school' is right about our ideological
origins, then perhaps there is hope for revitalizing our public life and
restoring a sense of community." This suggestion offers a more general
reason for linking the history of republicanism with our own debates:
One can embrace it without any care for the concept of liberty, without
the slightest regard for the elaborate turns of Straussian and Marxist
plaints against modernity. And, indeed, I think some view like Sandel's
animates much republican revisionism; political theorists routinely
offer interpretations of celebrated figures from the tradition to make
political points today. Not many ofus are really necrophiliacs, however
we may strike our colleagues.
Still, Sandel's claim sounds at least like a non sequitur. What could
his "if'' clause possibly have to do with his "then" clause? First we have a
historical question: Was civic humanism prominent in colonial America?
Then we have a political question: Is civic humanism a valuable
possibility for us today? These questions seem wholly independent; we
need an explanation of why one should think that answering yes to the
first makes it possible, or even easier, to answer yes to the second. Why
shouldn't there be "hope for revitalizing our public life," even if America
always was the stolidly Lockean land summoned up by Hartz? The
trivial verbal maneuver, that it can't be revitalized if it was never
communally vital in the first place, is manifestly unsatisfactory. We can
always rephrase the question: Why shouldn't there be hope for vitalizing
our public life for the first time? Those sympathetic to republicanism
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know full well the mystique of magical foundings; instead of bringing
our corrupt regime back to the first principles from which it has so sadly
fallen, why can't we create a republican regime for the first time? Why
can't we earn the praise Machiavelli lavishes on founders?
Perhaps we can. But we should proceed carefully; although there is
some gap between the historical question and the political one, it may be
impetuous to conclude that they are wholly independent. Let me sketch
three accounts of how we might connect them.
Consider first the possibility of exploiting some puzzles in the
philosophy of history. Difficult as it is to offer any straightforward
account of how some historical outcome was caused, we might play on
an equivocation in the claim that some event or tradition was
prominent. A skeptic might urge that we can never know how causally
efficacious it was. Replication is impossible; cross-cultural data for
comparative historical sociology always pose contentious questions of
interpretation; and we have no social theory like classical mechanics,
offering firm and readily validated accounts of causal triggers. So, the
skeptic might continue, talk of prominence in fact always lapses into
evaluative questions, even when parties to a dispute would strenuously
deny it. Deciding whether republicanism was prominent in the colonies
isn't simply a matter of toting up the numbers to see how many individuals were republicans. Nor can it be a matter of figuring out how
much of a difference republicanism made, because again we have no way
of grounding any claims about causation or counterfactuals. So it must
really be a matter of arguing about how valuable republicanism is.
Any such account would indeed tie historical questions to today's
political ones. But it would do so too easily, simply by transforming the
former into the latter. In this view, sometimes we argue about our
politics by talking about Reagan; sometimes we argue about our politics
by talking about Franklin; but we are always arguing about our politics.
A sweep through the sociology of knowledge may make such a view look
bleakly plausible, too. I have no facile refutation up my sleeve, no lucid
account of how we can sensibly discuss causation in history. But
republican revisionists would shrink from the suggestion that all they
are doing is masking our political arguments in centuries-old disguise.
Writers like Pocock and Gordon Wood are, after all, enormously
talented historians.
Consider second, then, what we might call the icon approach. Many
tend to revere august figures from the history of political thought. We
may all have our own favorites and enemies-Nietzsche, for instance, is
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frequently embraced, just as frequently excoriated-but one set of
favorites is widely shared in America. They are the Founders, caught up
in an extraordinary process of mythmaking from the time of the
Revolution. The Supreme Court frequently defers to the intentions of
the Founders, or at least claims to. Television commentators grace their
arguments with obligatory bows in their direction. Even college
students, not usually the most reverential crowd, expect and desire
plenty of laudatory comments on the Founders in classes on American
political thought.
We may disapprove of this sort of thing. However impressive
Franklin or Jefferson may be, we may think that clouding over their
achievements with a loving haze can only detract from responsible
political argument. Like it or not, though, the haze is now there, and it
serves an ideological function. For if we tend unthinkingly to embrace
liberalism, and we revere the Founders and think of them as liberals, our
liberal tendencies will only be reinforced, and we will look askance at
any daring to advance critiques of liberalism.
To open up debate, then, to force people to confront issues more
rationally, it may help to smash some icons. Historians may not simply
be gossiping when they tell us that Jefferson had an affair with his slave,
Sally Hemings. 15 Nor need we restrict our attention to allegedly
unsavory biographical facts; more intellectual modes of attack are
available. Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, makes Aristotle the
spearhead of his recent assault on liberal society, and astonishingly
reads Aristotle as oblivious to political conflict. 16 It then becomes
tempting to smash Maclntyre's icon, or turn his spearhead against him.
And so it becomes satisfying to discover that Aristotle says nothing like
what MacIntyre attributes to him. 17
Reinterpretations of the Founders can play a similar ideological role.
The goal may be to transfer unthinking allegiance from liberalism to
republicanism. Or, if our commitments to the Founders aren't that
overwhelming, the goal may be to deliver a bracing slap and force us to
confront an indictment of liberalism, instead of murmuring endlessly on
the brilliance of Madison. Our ideological attachments to great figures
in political thought thus tie the history of theory to present political
debates. Civic humanists can hardly be blamed for playing the game as it
stands.
Revisionists, though, might wish to deny that their scholarship
should be placed in so crassly ideological a context. They might offer a
more ambitious attempt to link our history with our present.
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Consider third, then, what we might call the "past is present"
approach. Suppose that any adequate account of our present will
inescapably be historical, that any desire to "forget all that historical
stuff' and offer a political-science analysis of the present is systematically
misconceived. If the present is always archaeological in this way, if our
cultural past endures as stubbornly as Freud thought our childhood
experiences do, then it matters whether the past was republican. For if it
was, then perhaps the present still is. Or, more accurately, then perhaps
the present could be, if we reclaimed the dormant but still present past.
Such a view would offer strong support for the claim that revisionist
history is directly relevant to our political debates. But can such a view
be worked out adequately here?
Take an easy case first, one premised on nothing more grandiose than
individual memory. Americans now are sensitive to the possibility of
repeating Vietnam. They disagree, of course, about how to interpret
Vietnam, or what a sad repetition would amount to: Would it be
allowing ourselves to be stuck in a quagmire? Or would it be allowing
our political will to be sapped by unconscionable domestic opposition?
Regardless, any adequate account of today's foreign policy debates
would have to refer to (competing accounts of) Vietnam. Generally, in
such cases it seems sensible to say that any account of our present must
include some of our past. Republican revisionists, however, cannot
exploit such cases. They are not reminding us that we, people alive now,
were ardent civic humanists ten or twenty years ago. So they can hardly
appeal to psychological memory.
Memory, though, might be reconceived in more sociological terms.
There are straightforward senses in which cultures have memories.
Social practices may endure past the settings in which they arose as
plausible solutions to contingent conflicts. Adam Smith, for instance,
argued that Englishmen in 1776 continued to cling to primogeniture,
even though its justification-namely, keeping land lots large enough to
repel attacks from barbarians or threatening neighbors-no longer
applied. 18 Anthropologists often suggest that today's natives carry on
versions, sometimes badly distorted versions at that, of rituals that were
richly meaningful generations before, but with no sense of how they
could be meaningful. Such examples provide a nonmysterious rendition
of Durkheim's social facts, which here are "outside" individuals without
our conjuring up some Casper the Social Ghost. Republican revisionists,
though, cannot exploit these cases either. They are not suggesting that
we continue to cling to republican practices without understanding their
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underlyingjustification or meaning. Indeed, it must be part of their case
that we have jettisoned our republican past, that its practices have
evaporated. After all, we happily accepted Hartz's portrait of a Lockean
America for some time; republicanism needed to be recovered with
painstaking historical care, not just pointed to.
Another sort of social fact-language-might seem to provide a
helpful key. Pocock himself has shown how a language may endure over
time, enabling ideas to be transmitted without individuals consciously
striving to transmit them. And Charles Taylor has argued that our
language does much more than allow us to swap propositions: In its
expressive dimension it is partly constitutive of our social practices and
our personal identities. 19 The language of common good does indeed
survive in America; sadly or predictably, it is an obligingly pliable
pretext, at the beck and call of politicians of all stripes. Now, that strand
of our self-image wrapped up in community may be withering and under
fire for all sorts ofreasons. We can round up the usual suspects, indicted
endlessly ever since the French Revolution: mechanist views of science
and the social sciences, atomistic conceptions of presocial individuals,
negative images of freedom suggesting that attachments to others
involve a loss of autonomy, bureaucratic or technocratic accounts of
rationality, and the social practices animated by such views. 20 But
surely, a republican might urge, it is an open question whether or not our
politics will succumb further to such onslaughts.
There are two ways of interpreting this case. Sometimes it is thought
that rejecting mechanism, atomism, and the rest must entail rejecting
liberalism. But liberalism is a tradition, not a single view, and like any
other tradition it is best conceived of as a family of disagreements.
Granted, Hobbes and Locke may seem to insist on instrumental
rationality, presocial individuals, and so on; but it hardly follows that
those positions are integral to liberalism. We need not even flee the
Anglo-American tradition and appeal to the likes of Aristotle and Hegel
to find critiques of such views. Adam Smith is fascinated by what we
would call the social construction of personal identity, and his Theory of
Moral Sentiments develops an elaborate account of the role of
reflexivity; David Hume scoffs at the myth of presocial individuals;
John Stuart Mill places self-development squarely at the heart of his
political theory: But all are liberals.
Second, it might be agreed that liberals can reject mechanism,
atomism, and the rest. But richer views of language and agency might
still provide the desired connection between past theories and present
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possibilities. Hidden away in our language, and so potentially in our
social lives, are the concepts and categories of republicanism. But here
we must beware two conflations. Human society may rest on "a high
degree of inter-subjective meanings," but "this can go along with
profound cleavage": Only those who fully understand one another can
fully loathe one another;2 1 tout comprendre, c'est tout detester. And it is
always an open question whether our implicitly republican vocabulary
furnishes an adequate interpretation of the world: Thinking the world is
congenial to republicanism doesn't make it so; no agent's beliefs about
his society are incorrigible. 22 So language seems insufficient on its own:
If our language and our practices mutually supported one another,
republicans would have a case. But if only our language still echoes with
republicanism, our self-image as republicans invites exposure as mere
nostalgia, or a quixotic hangover. For these reasons, I don't see how
language alone could furnish the relevant connections between our
history and our present politics.
In what other sense might the past endure? Are the posited
continuities between our republican ancestors and us purely geographical? Geography surely does not suffice to establish any cultural
continuities. Glaciers once crossed the United States, too, but that
hardly shows we can "recapture" our glacial past. Does it matter that
here, right here in America, people were virtuous citizens, or thought
others should be? With neither a psychological nor a sociological sense
in which the past endures, what is the point of appealing to a specifically
American past? Would anything be lost if republicans appealed to
events in sixteenth-century Florence?
My purpose in raising such possibilities is emphatically not to suggest
that there are no interesting ties between our history and our present. It
is instead to give a sense of the alarmingly different interpretations of
that claim we can offer. Many writers working today in the history of
civic humanism assert or imply some connec:tion between that history
and our political debates today. They need to articulate precisely what
sort of connection they have in mind; otherwise, our discussions will
flounder.

II
Those championing republicanism, virtue, and community today
also need to explain in some more detail than they have just what sort of
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politics they are offering. Too much time has been spent assaulting
liberalism, too little articulating and defending an alternative in any
detail. 23 Sometimes the gap between indictment and remedy is simply
laughable. Thus George Will, in his "complaint against the modern
world," summons up apocalyptic visions of our desperate predicament.
When it comes to solutions, though, Will calls vaguely-and troublingly-for a politics that "can be thrilling and noble," or tells us that
"A nation offers limitless scope for moral explorations. " 24 (He does
propose tightening up pornography laws, but that solution seems
incongruously trivial, given the gloom-and-doom portrait he offers of
our problems.)
It is, of course, a far cry from Will's jeremiad to some of our more
sober scholarly debates. But the same intimations of impending disaster
haunt the latter, and they are all too often vague in the same way. By
leaving their central concepts unhappily vague or abstract, republican
theorists make their case inviting to those already inclined to agree,
unconvincing to those inclined to disagree-and just plain confusing to
those of us without any marked inclinations at all. Here is one striking
parallel between historical and political issues: Neither can be pursued
profitably without a focused vocabulary. So I mean now to raise some
questions to which republicans owe us answers. My comments here are
critical, sometimes sharply so. But they are not refutations: We rarely if
ever find those in political theory. Instead they are invitations to
republicans to make their position more articulate than they have so far.
To talk about the political merits of republicanism today, I will
discuss some historical figures. My own use of history here falls under
two of the possibilities I canvassed above. Like Skinner, I want to
underline the claim that some view is possible by showing that it was
actually embraced; I do not want to be accused, that is, of dreaming up
fantastic possibilities. I also want to employ an inversion of the icon
strategy, by supplying an unsavory figurehead-Benjamin Rush-for
the republican cause. And, finally, I shall offer some brief comments on
Machiavelli's History of Florence, comments intended to suggest that
the fount of modern republicanism not only confronted some problems
with republicanism, but offered remedies that one might be tempted to
call liberal in spirit.
One Founder who has received more than his share of attention from
republicans is Thomas Jefferson. Pocock says that Jefferson is "as
committed as any classical republican to the ideal of virtue. " 25 We are
used to thinking of Jefferson in terms of yeoman farmers and the like,
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and it would be foolish to deny that he sometimes adopts the language of
civic humanism. He can celebrate farmers as "the most valuable citizens
... the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous," and he
can juxtapose republican "vigour" and "degeneracy. " 26 But it would be
hasty to infer that the mere appearance of such words shows that
Jefferson is best conceived of as a republican. We need to explore just
what use he puts them to in his writings, to ask if his usage perhaps
precludes lumping him together with the likes of Machiavelli or
Harrington.
Indeed, it is misleading to cast Jefferson as a republican. Joyce
Appleby has ably argued that much of our image of Jeffersonincluding that of the yeoman farmer-simply finds no support in his
writings.27 More important, Jefferson's commitments do more than
introduce Harringtonian modifications into classical republicanism; 28
they drive him outside that tradition. Three points are worth noting.
First, Pocock rightly notes that Venice "became a myth, exercising
compulsive force on the imagination" in the civic humanist tradition. 29
But then Jefferson's blunt rejection of Venice-"173 despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on
the republic of Venice" 30 -speaks symbolic volumes. Second, Jefferson's
enthusiastic fight for religious toleration hardly fits well with the view,
so central in say Machiavelli's thought, that religion can be a wonderful
tool for political socialization. Third, Jefferson was happy to distance
himself from the claim that talented individuals owe their lives to their
country. Even in private letters, Jefferson never could have claimed
proudly to love his country more than himself. Instead, he somewhat
soutly insisted that individuals may live their own lives: "It were
contrary to feeling and indeed ridiculous to suppose a man had less right
in himself than one of his neighbors or all of them put together. This
would be slavery. " 31 These views help make Jefferson attractive, at least
to those of us fond of liberalism. They also make him an unlikely model
for communitarian critics of liberalism.
A more likely model is Benjamin Rush (1746-1813), Professor of
Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, Physician General for
Washington's army, prolific writer on medical, political, and educational
issues, friend of more famous Founders, and himself a signer of the
Declaration. Rush is best known for a paper presented to the American
Philosophical Society in 1799. In his "Observations Intended to Favour
a Supposition that the Black Color (As It Is Called) of the Negroes is
Derived from the Leprosy," Rush argued that the woolly hair, flattened
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nose, broad lips, and superhuman sexuality of blacks arises from a
curious kind of leprosy. This he took to be a compassionate point, since
it meant that blacks were entitled to solicitous care, not abuse. Rush also
took it to be a politically significant point. Like other colonial republicans, he worried that a racially heterogeneous community might never
become a politically unified one. If blacks were diseased, though, they
might be cured. Rush speculated that nature might be spontaneously
curing blacks (so he interpreted some cases of albinism), and added that
we might be able to accelerate nature's cure by applying pressure to the
skin, or perhaps unripe peach juice. 32
It would be easy-too easy-to dismiss this as yet another example of
how ideology affects the practice of science. It is that, but, more
important, it also poses a political question for republicans. Suppose, as
is manifestly true, that we now live in a society hardly unified by a shared
understanding of the common good, hardly peopled by virtuous citizens
always willing to renounce their partial claims in the interests of the
whole community. We then face a transition problem: What means shall
we employ for forging (or "recovering") a republican politics? It would
be amusingly ahistorical to suggest that we have no choice but to start
"curing" blacks, or to embrace Jacobin terror. Yet there are less
anachronistic but equally disturbing options: We might move to quash
gay rights, or keep women in traditional roles, thinking that the
increased freedom of either group threatens social order and community.
These options are unpleasant, no doubt; but we need a theoretical
account of why we should resist them. Today's republicans owe us an
account of how we are to build a politics of civic virtue in the United
States, among citizens "entangled in a network of obligations and
involvements unassociated with any act of will, and yet unmediated by
those common identifications or expansive self-definitions that would
make them tolerable. " 33 To put the point succinctly, if liberalism is the
problem, how could republicanism be the solution?
Education, broadly conceived, may seem to some the answer to this
question. Our identities aren't set in concrete; with new experiences, we
may come to reconceive ourselves, to become the sorts of citizens
republican politics demands that we be. Education, though, can mean
many different things. The mere word cannot provide an answer to the
transition problem. And some modes of education may be repugnant.
Consider again Rush. Rush was dead set against the religious
toleration urged by Jefferson. He was charmed by the "moral order" he
observed in Edinburgh, with "churches ... filled on Sundays," packs of
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cards nowhere to be found, little swearing or drunkenness, and more, a
lovely state of affairs he attributed to "the parochial instructions of the
clergy. "34 Rush was happy to generalize from his visit to Edinburgh. In
1791, he urged the universal adoption of the Bible as a school book.
Assuming "that Christianity is the only true and perfect religion, and
that in proportion as mankind adopt its principles, and obey its
precepts, they will be wise, and happy," Rush lamented America's
failure to adopt "the only means of establishing and perpetuating our
republican forms of government, that is, the universal education of our
youth in the principles of Christianity, by means of the Bible. "35 In 1798,
he set out a more general view of education. 36 Aspiring to imitate the
Spartans, Rush rejected the grand tour, or any kind of education
abroad. Americans, he thought, were too diverse already; pluralism is
the enemy of "uniform and peaceable government." Rush again urged
the adoption of Christianity, neatly articulating the structure of his
republicanism: "without [religion] there can be no virtue, and without
virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all
republican governments." The New Testament would serve best, since
"a Christian cannot fail of being a republican." (The transmission of
civic humanism from Florence to America here resembles the game of
telephone, where the message is systematically garbled.)
Rush's education (if successful) would produce not just morally
upright citizens, but politically devoted ones. Here Rush set himself
against Jefferson's claim that one is entitled to live for oneself. (In an
ambivalent sketch of Jefferson, Rush reports that when he asked
Jefferson if he would be willing to go to France as a Commissioner,
Jefferson "said 'he would go to hell to serve his country' "-but he adds
that when elected, Jefferson "declined at that time on account of the
sickness of his wife. "37) Rush's Christian student would indeed be a
zealous republican: "Our country includes family, friends and property,
and should be preferred to them all. Let our pupil be taught that he does
not belong to himself, but that he is public property." Yet it would be
unrealistic, added Rush in a sudden moment of xenophobic sobriety, to
expect students "to embrace, with equal affection, the whole family of
mankind," so they may prefer citizens of the United States. Rush's
student would also learn correct political theory-"He must be taught
that there can be no durable liberty but in a republic"-and wash it
down with Sparta's black broth. Even the golden age, concluded Rush,
could be no more delightful than the world the Pennsylvania legislature
could create by adopting his educational program.
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Religious and political indoctrination, then, is one possible approach
to education. Given Rush's arguments, one might wonder if there are
deep similarities between civic humanists in the academy and the Moral
Majority. One might wonder more generally if the republican tradition
has an element of hostility to individualism itself, if virtuous citizens are
unpleasantly like robots. Rush pulls no punches, but staunchly affirms
that "it is plain, that I consider it is possible to convert men into
republican machines," machines who would unhesitatingly affirm that
"Every man in a republic is public property. His time and talents-his
youth-his manhood-his old age-nay more, life, all, belong to his
country. "38
Dismissing Rush as a lunatic republican, an eccentric representative
of the tradition, will not do. For one thing, we need again an account of
why this sort of thing is lunatic; for another, it simply isn't eccentric. It
was Rousseau who insisted that good citizens are too stupid to be fooled
by clever arguments, 39 that good education will "choke off vices before
they are born," that "The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes,
must gaze upon the fatherland, and until his dying day should behold
nothing else. "40 Robots do not make creative citizens, but the republican
tradition tends to attribute political creativity exclusively to the great
legislator who shapes society. Republican citizens "participate," but
only to reinforce their socialization. That is why, however weird it might
seem from the standpoint of democratic theory, Rousseau's citizens are
not supposed to talk too much in exercising their sovereignty. 41 And
that is why the citizens of Harrington's Oceana worship Cromwell; one
citizen breaks down with "tears of joy" in obsequiously celebrating the
Lord Archon (Cromwell's transparent disguise in the work):
Ah, my Lord Archon shall walk the streets (as it be for his ease I mean) with a
switch, while the people run after him, and pray for him; he shall not wet his foot,
they will strew flowers in his way; he shall sit higher in their hearts, and in the
judgment of all good men, than the kings that go up stairs unto their seats, and one
of these had as good pull two or three of his fellows out of the great chairs as wrong
him or meddle with him; he has two or three hundred thousand men that, when you
say the word, shall sell themselves unto their shirts for him and die at his foot. 42

These are graphic and repellent images of just what one can accomplish-or hope to-in educating virtuous citizens.
Even a proposed strategy for transition as seemingly innocent as
education, then, may be worrisome. Again, if republican politics are to
be seriously offered as a live option for us today, we need some story
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about how we might realize the considerable requisite social and
psychological transformations. But there are at least two more problems
for republicans besides the transition problem: specifying a consensus
and dealing with conflict.
Like their forebears, today's civic humanists long for a world in which
people share fundamental projects. Looking at our liberal pluralist
society, they see chaos instead of a harmoniously ordered community in
which some shared te/os allows us to resolve our disagreements. 43 A
diagnosis of chaos may depend on viewing the world through the lens of
Aristotelian or Durkheimian social theory, not on any actual problem in
the world. 44 We have no good reason, that is, to think that fundamental
moral consensus is what it takes to hold society together. Be that as it
may, republicans also owe us an account of what commitments should
bind us, what content the communal attachments that should transcend
our individual projects should have, what exactly the common good
should be.
Critics of liberalism are fond of charging liberalism with being
perniciously incomplete. Liberals, they tell us, refuse to hold up any
authoritative conception of the good life; liberals think that all that
matters is survival, or the gratification of appetites. Liberals have an
easy rejoinder: Politics is now one social setting among many, so
individuals can pursue the good life in other social settings. To say that
politics shouldn't be about the good life isn't to say that the good life
doesn't matter. The accusation seems better directed against republicans.
That we should share commitments may sound inviting; it might be nice
to live in a community with others who shared your deepest commitments, especially if you could play on game-theoretic, many-leveled
knowledge (you know they agree, they know you agree, you know they
know ... ). But which commitments should we share?
Rush's answer, that we should share Christianity and moral order, is
not likely to appeal to civic humanists in the academy, whatever its
appeal outside the academy. Naming any conception of the common
good would of course reinforce the transition problem: Once the
conception is on the table, it will seem even more implausible that we
could lead everyone to agree on it-whatever the conception is.
Maybe republicans should try to sidestep the question, by adopting a
procedural account of how we will specify what the common good is: by
democratic debate. Celebrations of democracy are doubtless not the
same as those of civic virtue, but they may meet here. 45 Once again,
though, we need to hear more. Will the debate be direct or representa-
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tive? Will it be decentralized or national? Communitarians are often
suspicious of representative democracy, which they are inclined to
denigrate as a pallid liberal caricature of real democracy. 46 And the
tradition tells us that republican fervor is easier to sustain in local
settings. But how many of us would like to be living in the deep South
when the people assemble to vote on what the common good is?
Whether they plump for representation or direct self-rule, for a
national politics or a local one, republicans might point out that we
often think of democratic debate as yielding a consensus. Sometimes,
though, that consensus is better understood as an uneasy compromise,
subject to constant renegotiation, than as genuine agreement. And
sometimes democratic politics yields no consensus at all; even such
garden-variety settings as school board politics can be enduringly
divisive. Surely it strains credibility to suggest that public debate over
the common good, over what fundamental projects citizens should
share, would yield any real consensus. And surely if it did, we would
have to worry that a lack of vigorous disagreement would make
democratic debate less intelligent than it would otherwise be. Deepseated disagreements need not be deplored as a sign of the fragility of
community in modern society; they can be embraced as integral to
full-blooded debate. And democratic citizens can agree that vigorous
debate is a good thing without agreeing on conceptions of the good life.
Liberals generally may agree that we do have a shared interest in
upholding liberal democratic institutions. But any such account of the
common good, leaving us free to frame wildly conflicting life plans,
would not satisfy our republicans.
Ironically, today's republicans may be more confident of the
possibilities of attaining consensus than their intellectual ancestors. So
it becomes tempting-here's the icon strategy again-to set Machiavelli
against our republicans. Machiavelli has been accused of dreaming, of
uncritically echoing stale Roman platitudes on the common good. 47 The
charge is probably unfair to Roman political thought: In a shrewd piece
of debunking (and the first real piece of behaviorism I know), Polybius
exposes the famed civic virtue that makes Roman soldiers so valiant as
nothing but the effects of a carefully designed scheme of rewards and
punishments on rational agents. 48 The charge is surely unfair to
Machiavelli, whose community of civic virtue is conflict-ridden.
In fact, Machiavelli insists that "those who believe republics can be
united are greatly deceived in their belief. "49 The relevant text here is
Machiavelli's History of Florence; for those not captivated by Machia-
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velli's claims that everything he knows is in the Prince and the
Discourses, the History is decidedly interesting, clarifying the Discourses' waves toward a politics of the common good. Guelf against
Ghibelline, Bianca against Nera, nobles against middle class, Buondelmonti against Uberti, Donati against Cerchi, Albizzi against Ricci: The
list of Florentine conflict stretches on and on. Although Machiavelli
wants to ridicule Florence's failure even to approach the grandeur of
Rome, the stubborn endurance of such conflict does not itself rule out
Florence's claim to be a republic. Unity may even be the enemy of
republican liberty. When the Duke of Athens took control of Florence,
"he said it was not his purpose to take away the city's liberty, but to give
it back again, because only disunited cities were slaves and united ones
free." Yet Machiavelli disapproves: The Duke had a "hardened mind" in
rejecting the Signors' plea that he content himself with freely given,
partial authority, and his installment in the Palace "took place to the
incredible sorrow and afflictions of good men, and to the great pleasure
of those who through either ignorance or malice agreed to it. "50
The Duke's rule was harsh, marked by heavy taxes, unjust judgments,
cruelty, murder, torture, exploitation, the importation of French
customs, and rapes. His rule epitomizes a point Machiavelli tirelessly
repeats in the History: A politics of the common good relying on a single
individual is fragile. 51 Should the individual be weak, greedy, or
passionate, he may harm the whole city. Republican self-government,
with less concentration of power, has less potential for abuse.
But again, there is no question that there will still be pointed
disagreement. In Machiavelli's view, both Rome and Florence were
disunited. The differences lay in how acrimonious the disputes were and
how they were handled. Where Rome debated, Florence fought; Rome
legislated, Florence exiled and killed; Rome boosted her military
strength, Florence "wholly destroyed" hers; and-intriguingly for
egalitarian republicans-Rome was left with greater inequality, Florence greater equality. 52
How, then, does Machiavelli propose to deal with conflict? In a way
strikingly reminiscent of Bentham and Madison, writers not ordinarily
thought of as his intellectual bedfellows. The Machiavellian legislator
tries to ensure that the pursuit of private interest will pay off in public
benefits, and even has "selfishly ambitious men ... watch each other in
order that lawful bounds may not be overpassed. "53
I have no desire to enlist Machiavelli as a closet liberal, no desire to
suggest that any thoughtful remedies for political conflict will lead in
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liberal directions. Instead, I want to point out that liberalism would
provide resources for answering all the questions I've raised about
republican politics. Thinking of individuals as having rights, thinking of
those rights as shields enabling individuals to pursue their own plans,
would eliminate troubling solutions to the transition problem. We could
not entertain coercion, for it would violate rights. Casting education as a
way of helping individuals make informed choices would rule out any
schemes hanging on turning individuals into machines. Embracing a
theory of liberal democracy would rule out unconstrained majority
rule. 54 Employing a host of constitutional, legal, and institutional
safeguards against the abusive exercise of political power would give us
sensible ways of moderating political conflict-as would keeping such
explosive subjects as conceptions of the good off the political agenda in
the first place.
Today's republicans, though, do not want to draw on such familiar
liberal strategies. They want republicanism to be an alternative to
liberalism. No one would deny, however, that there are characteristic
dilemmas arising in the tradition of civic virtue (just as there are in other
traditions). Does the tradition boast adequate resources to deal with its
own problems? Are there principled republican explanations of why the
noxious possibilities summoned up by the likes of Rush represent bad
republicanism? Or must republicans always covertly draw on liberal
principles?
I suggested earlier that if liberalism is the problem, it is hard to see
how republicanism could be the solution. Some may want to invert the
point, and say that republicanism is the problem, liberalism the
solution. I am not (yet) willing to adopt that claim, and surely have not
defended it here. Instead, I have raised some pressing questions for
republicans, questions I hope will focus and deepen our political debate.
We can only gain from attempts to answer these questions: A more
focused debate can reveal if republicanism is a vibrant remedy for the ills
of liberalism, an incurably vacuous collection of sentimental slogans, or
an alluring but destructive siren's song.
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